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ABSTRACT 
Four studies examined the role of a decision's consistency with the orientation 
of the decision-maker in determining regret. In accordance with our 
consistency-fit model of regret, the consistency of a decision in relation to 
decision-makers' goals (Experiments 1), mood states (Experiment 3), and 
personality orientations (Experiments 2 and 4) predicted regret levels such 
that consistent decisions were less regrettable than decisions that were inconsistent. 
In Experiment 1, consistent decisions were defined in relation to 
decision-makers' goals of changing their typical behavior. Results revealed 
that decisions that were consistent with the goals of changing their typical 
behavior were less regrettable. In addition, Experiments 2-4 found that the 
salience of counterfactuals augmented participants' feelings of regret, supporting 
the view that accessible alternatives to chosen courses of behavior 
can serve as affective cues. Implications of a consistency-fit view of regret 
for norm theory, self-regulation and affect as information were discussed. 
  
Regret is a pervasive part of life and is cited as one of the most frequently experienced 
emotions (Shimanoff, 1984). Therefore it is not surprising that the topic of 
regret has been approached from a variety of perspectives, including philosophical 
treatises, literature, and social science (see Gavansky & Wells, 1989; Landman, 
1993; Roese & Olson, 1995). "Indeed, to regret entails a whole host of psychic processes, 
including thinking, imagining, feeling, comparing, evaluating, doubting, 
denying, refusing , or affirming . . . " (p. 45, Landman, 1993). However, with the 
development of Kahneman's norm theory (e.g., Kahneman, 1995; Kahneman & 
Miller, 1986), regret almost became synonymous with counterfactuals: Now regret 
is commonly defined as a "counterfactual emotion" ((e.g., Roese & Olson, 1995; 
Roese, Sanna, & Galinsky, 2005). 
 
From the perspective of norm theory, regret is associated with the generation 
of imagined alternatives to an undesired outcome. Counterfactual thought has 
been defined as a logical proposition—a conditional—containing an antecedent (If 
only . . . ) and a consequent (then the outcome would have been different; Roese & 
Olson, 1995. Counterfactuals are thoughts concerning how a behavior or outcome 
could be undone or how a behavior may not have been executed (Kahneman & 
Miller, 1986). The normativeness of a behavior can alter the number of counterfactuals 
generated and the level of experienced regret. Normativeness traditionally 
has been conceptualized in terms of frequency and/or typicality. Atypical behaviors 
or decisions are more mutable and thus generate especially high levels of regret. 
However, from the consistency-fit model, and as demonstrated in Experiment 
1, atypical actions are not always more regrettable. 
 
 
CONSISTENCY-EIT AND SELF-REGULATION 
 
Feelings of regret that derive from the consistency of a decision may help us navigate 
through the mine fields of life by providing important feedback about whether 
our choices are in line with our aspirations or our character. Feelings of regret 
may help move us away from choices that do not fit our goals, whether we have 
desires to make changes or to maintain our current states. More specifically, the 
consistency-fit of a decision and resulting levels of regret may serve as cues operating 
within the monitoring or "test" phase of regulatory feedback-loops (e.g., 
Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Carver & Scheier, 1981). Test phases necessarily 
involve comparisons of the actual state of the self to standards; therefore, comparisons 
indicating that poor decisions were of a type that were commensurate 
with these standards or goals (i.e., were consistent) would be less regrettable than 
those that were incongruent with these goal states. According to this view, one 
would predict that decisions that do not turn out well but are in agreement with 
the nature of individuals' personality or goals would be less regrettable than are 
more incongruent decisions, even when the negative outcomes are objectively the 
same. At the very least, congruent decisions are potential means to desired ends 
and were the result of personalized processes. 
 
Goals can involve desires to change (e.g., lose weight, quit smoking) or can involve 
desires to maintain current states. In the case of goal-related change, regret 
tells us that our decisions are not moving us in a desired direction. For example, 
choosing to eat a high calorie meal is not consistent with goals to lose weight and 
 
may be regretted, especially if the meal is not particularly good. Experiment 1 assessed 
this hypothesis. 
 
Goals also can involve desires to maintain current states or ways of being. As 
Shakespeare wrote in Hamlet—"This above all: to thine own self be true." This 
classic passage expresses the idea that behaving in ways that are "true to self" is 
in itself an important terminal goal. So, making poor decisions that are not consistent 
with one's personality may be more regrettable than poor decisions that are 
consistent with one's character. Regardless of whether the goal is to maintain or 
change, feelings of regret may function within self-regulatory systems as affective 
feedback providing information about whether our life choices are in line with our 
goals. 
 
According to this consistency-fit perspective, poor decisions that are consistent 
with persons' goals are predicted to be less regretted than are inconsistent decisions— 
that is, consistency-fit predicts regret (e.g.. Seta, McElroy, & Seta, 2001). 
Further, because a poor outcome is inherently more inconsistent with individuals' 
goals of obtaining positive outcomes, individuals should feel more intense levels 
of regret when poor decisions produce very negative outcomes than when they 
produce less severe ones. For instance, a decision to buy a boring educational toy 
that resulted in a child's disappointment would be less regrettable than a decision 
involving negative health consequences to the child. 
 
As this example indicates, and as found in our previous research (Seta et al., 
2001), the intensity of the negative outcome per se also affects regret. Negative affect 
may provide both motivation and direction to behavior. For example, because 
of heightened levels of negative affect (regret) that resulted from incongruent prior 
decisions, individuals may avoid making these choices in the future. Thus this 
component of regret also may operate within self-regulatory systems. 
 
 
COUNTERFACTUALS AND REGRET 
 
There is little evidence that counterfactuals are related to regret. Few studies have 
actually empirically investigated the relationship between counterfactuals and 
regret, but those that have did not find a significant relationship between these 
variables, (e.g., N'gbala & Branscombe, 1997; Seta et al, 2001). Nevertheless, it 
seems logical that there should be such a relationship. Counterfactual thinking 
increases awareness of how the present circumstances could have been different 
"if only . . . ." When these alternatives are salient, obtained poor outcomes may 
be perceived as especially negative and undesirable. The present research was designed 
to assess whether a relationship between counterfactuals and regret would 
be obtained when counterfactuals were made salient to participants. We also investigated 
whether there is a relationship between the numbers of counterfactuals 
generated and regret. To investigate this issue, we manipulated the salience of 
regret in Experiments 2-4 and assessed the effect of these manipulations on participants' 
regret levels. 
 
Our previous research has demonstrated a primary role of consistency between 
a decision and characteristics of decision-makers in determining regret levels, but 
found no evidence of a relationship between regret and the number of counterfactuals 
generated (Seta et al., 2001). In the present work, we took steps to increase 
the salience of counterfactuals with expectations that the salience manipulations 
would affect the likelihood of finding a role of counterfactuals in determining regret. 
It may be the case that regret occurs through a direct route of comparing 
decisions to relevant standards or may influence regret by affecting the number of 
counterfactuals generated. 
When made salient, the number of counterfactuals generated may serve as affective 
cues affecting regret levels. For example, when persons are aware of many alternatives 
to the obtained poor outcome, such as when counterfactuals are salient, 
regret levels may be higher than when there are fewer accessible counterfactuals 
or when counterfactuals do not come easily to mind. This suggestion is in line with 
the perspective of Sanna and Schwarz's affect as information analysis (e.g., Sarma 
& Schwarz, 2004; Schwarz, 1998; Schwarz & Clore, 1996). 
 
 
OVERVIEW 
 
Experiment 1 extended the consistency-fit analysis into the domain of goal-related 
motives to change current normative or typical behavior. Previous research testing 
and supporting the consistency-fit model (Seta et al., 2001) did not include manipulations 
designed to implicate motives to change from typical states. Rather, in 
these studies, the critical consistency relationships were between decisions and aspects 
of decision-makers' mood states or behavioral orientations (e.g., risk-averse 
or risk-seeking tendencies). 
 
In Experiment 1, participants read about a decision-maker who had a goal to 
make a change in her eating habits and then made a decision to order a meal that 
was either consistent or inconsistent with that goal. The meal proved not to be 
especially good. According to the consistency-fit model, persons should judge the 
decision-maker as having a relatively high level of regret when she made a choice 
that was inconsistent with her goal. Thus, we predicted that the target person who 
made a decision that was typical, but inconsistent with her goal (e.g., an overweight 
person ordering a high calorie meal) would be judged as having more, not 
less regret than the target person who made an atypical, but consistent decision. 
This prediction is based on the idea that consistency cm serve a self-regulatory 
function in producing heightened levels of regret when one's decisions are not 
commensurate with desired end states. We tested this idea in Experiment 1. 
 
In Experiments 2-4, we varied the consistency of a decision in relation to the 
decision-makers' personality characteristics (Experiments 2 and 4) or mood states 
(Experiment 3). We predicted that the consistency of the decision with respect to 
extant mood states and personality characteristics would predict participants' 
feelings and judgments of regret; low levels of consistency would be associated 
with high levels of regret. In our previous research (e.g.. Seta et al., 2001), we did 
not find evidence that the production of counterfactuals increased regret. Experiments 
2-4 were designed in an attempt to extend this work by assessing whether 
a relationship between the numbers of counterfactuals generated and regret levels 
would be obtained when we manipulated the salience of counterfactuals. Interestingly, 
research has assumed that counterfactuals augment feelings of regret; yet, 
very little research has assessed this assumption (see Seta, et al., 2001 for further 
discussion). By finding evidence that the salience of counterfactuals increases regret, 
this research would provide some evidence that this conunon assumption 
has validity. 
 
In Experiment 2, we used the classic Kahneman "Mr. Paul" stock switching paradigm, 
with modifications that involved describing the nature of Mr. Paul's person- 
ality. In doing so, we were able to manipulate the consistency of Mr. Paul's decision 
with respect to his personality orientation. From the consistency-fit perspective, 
we predicted that participants would judge Mr. Paul's level of regret to be especially 
intense when his decision was inconsistent with his personality orientation. 
The design also included two measures of participant's judgments of "Mr. Paul's" 
regret. One came before participants were asked to generate counterfactuals about 
Mr. Paul's decision and one came after this counterfactual generation task. 
 
In Experiment 3, we assessed participants' own poor decisions and their regret 
levels in an autobiographical, decision-retrospection paradigm (e.g., Roese, Hur, 
& Pennington, 1999) and tested whether the consistency of participants' decisions 
with respect to mood maintenance goals influenced their feelings of regret. In addition, 
the timing of participants' regret responses were manipulated; they either 
came pre- or post-counterfactual generation. Counterfactuals should be more salient 
when they preceded, rather than followed, participants' judgments of regret; 
thus, we predicted that participants would experience the highest level of regret in 
the post-counterfactual generation condition. 
 
Study 4 used a quasi-experimental design in which we used the procedure of Experiment 
3 but included both introverted and extraverted participants. According 
to our consistency-fit model, decisions that are inconsistent with decision-makers' 
personality orientation are more regrettable than are decisions that are consistent 
with these orientations. Staying home is consistent with the orientation of an introvert; 
therefore, introverted persons should find unfavorable outcomes associated 
with a decision to go out more regrettable than those associated with a poor decision 
to stay home and extraverted persons should find unfavorable outcomes associated 
with a poor decision to stay home to be more regrettable than a poor decision 
to go out. This study also provided an opportunity to further assess the role of 
counterfactual generation within this autobiographical retrospection paradigm. 
 
Studies 2-4 also provided an opportunity to assess whether consistency manipulations 
play a role in determining the number of counterfactuals persons generate. 
For example, it may be the case that persons may think of more alternative realities 
when their decision was inconsistent with their goal states, moods, or personalities 
than when their decision was more consistent. If this is the case, then consistency 
might affect regret by influencing the number of counterfactuals generated. To assess 
this possibility, we measured both the number of counterfactuals participants 
generated as well as their judgments of the consistency of the decisions. Regression 
analyses were conducted to assess whether these factors were independent or 
redundant predictors of regret. 
 
 
 
 
 
EXPERIMENT 1 
 
The consistency-fit conceptualization of regret is that it is a negative emotional 
state that results from a mismatch between a poor decision and the decision-maker's 
goals, mood-state or personality characteristics, as well as from the consequences 
that are associated with a decision that turns out poorly. When there 
is a mismatch, and thus a poor consistency-fit, decision-makers experience more 
regret than when there is not a mismatch. The following experiment tested the 
view that the congruence between a person's goal and his or her decision is a fac- 
tor determining subsequent feelings of regret. In Experiment 1, participants read 
about a person who was either underweight or overweight and had made a New 
Year's resolution to change her eating habits and either gain (underweight condition) 
or lose (overweight condition) some weight. Then the target person made 
a decision to order a meal that was either high or low in calories, constituting a 
goal-consistent or inconsistent manipulation. We assess(id participants' judgments 
of the amount of regret the target felt about this decision when the meal turned out 
not to be especially tasty. 
 
 
METHOD: EXPERIMENT 1 
 
Participants, Design, and Procedures 
Sixty-two participants (25 women and 37 men) from Wake Forest University participated 
in Experiment 1 in exchange for partial credit toward their research option 
in Introductory Psychology. They were assigned randomly to one of two between 
subjects conditions: goal consistent or goal inconsistent decisions. Whether 
the goal was to lose or gain weight was counterbalanced within each of these conditions 
(between subjects) and each of these conditions was represented within the 
single session comprising the study. 
 
Participants were informed that the study dealt with decision-making and, after 
informed consent was obtained, were asked to consider a situation in which a person 
was underweight (or overweight) and made a New Year's resolution to change 
her eating habits and either gain (or lose) some weight. A week later, she went to 
dinner with friends and had a choice between meals that cost just about the same 
but differed in the caloric content. The target was then described as having made 
a decision to order the meal with the most calories (which was goal consistent in 
the gain weight condition but was goal inconsistent in the lose weight condition) 
or was described as having made the decision to order the meal with the least calories 
(which was goal consistent in the lose weight condition and goal inconsistent 
in the gain weight condition). They read that this meal was not especially tasty and 
were asked how much regret they thought the person felt given her meal choice. 
We also measured whether participants felt they could relate to this situation, and 
how they judged the realism of the described scenario. 
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION: EXPERIMENT 1 
 
Most of the participants found the situation described in this study to be realistic. 
The modal value of the realism question was 90 and the median was 80 (on a 
100-point scale with higher numbers indicating higher realism judgments.) 
Initial analyses found no significant effects of whether the goal described in Experiment 
1 was to gain or lose weight; therefore this counter-balancing factor was 
not considered in further analyses. A one-factor ANOVA on the experimental conditions 
(goal consistent and goal inconsistent decision) was conducted, revealing a 
significant effect of this manipulation, .F(l, 62) = 4.09, p < .05. As expected, participants 
judged the target as feeling the most regret when she had made a decision 
that was inconsistent (M - 65.31) than when her decision was commensurate with 
her goal (M = 53.27).[1] 
 
The results of this study showed that judged regret levels were lower for poor 
decisions that were in line with goals than for poor decisions that were inconsistent 
with goals. These results were predicted from the assumptions of the consistency-fit 
model and suggest that the consistency-fit of a decision and resulting levels 
of regret may serve as cues operating within the monitoring or "test" phase of 
regulatory feedback loops (e.g., Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Carver & Scheier, 
1981). Test phases necessarily involve comparisons of the actual state of the self to 
standards; therefore, comparisons indicating that poor decisions were at least of a 
t5^e that were commensurate with these standards (i.e., were consistent) should 
be, and were, judged as less regrettable than poor decisions that were incongruent 
with goals. Experiment 1 supported this reasoning and provided support for a definition 
of regret that posits decision-consistency as a key determinant of regret. 
 
 
EXPERIMENT 2 
 
The classic "Mr. Paul" stock switching vignette has been the paradigm most often 
utilized in early research on regret. In spite of the limitations of using scenarios, 
we decided that exploring a role for counterfactual generation and consistency 
relationships should be explored in this classic paradigm so that our results could 
be easily compared with these studies. In addition, people's perceptions of the 
emotions others experience are important in their own right and this method is 
appropriate for assessing this type of person perception. So, the classic "Mr. Paul" 
stock switching vignette was utilized with the modification that Mr. Paul was described 
as a risk-taker. Because we described the target as a risk-taker, we expected 
participants to judge his regret level to be relatively higher when Mr. Paul choose 
not to switch stocks (inaction) than when he choose to switch stocks (action condition). 
We took initial regret judgments after participants read about the poor 
outcomes of the target's decision. We then asked them to generate counterfactuals 
using typical procedures utilized in the study of counterfactuals (e.g., Roese et 
al., 1999). Following the counterfactual generation task, we asked participants to 
make another judgment about Mr. Paul's level of regret. The intervention of counterfactuals 
between the two regret measures was predicted to make counterfactuals 
accessible and salient and, therefore, increase participants' judgments of regret 
relative to their first responses. 
 
 
 
METHOD: EXPERIMENT 2 
 
Participants and Design 
Sixty female participants from introductory psychology classes from a public 
University (UNCG) were assigned randomly to a 2 x 2 mixed-factor design. The 
between-participants component of the design consisted of two types of decisions 
(action/inaction) described as performed by a risk-seeking businessman. The salience 
of counterfactuals variable was manipulated within-subjects by asking participants 
to indicate their regret judgments before (nonsalient) and after (salient) 
they listed counterfactual statements. 
 
 
Procedure 
Participants completed the experiment in small groups in the context of a study of 
person perception. All materials were presented in written form so that all conditions 
were represented within each session. Participants read a description of a 
businessman. These descriptions contained information that was virtually identical 
to that used by Kahneman and Tversky (1982). In the action vignette, participants 
read Mr. Paul owned shares in Company B. During the past year, he 
switched to stock in Company A. He now finds that h(; would have been better 
off by $1,200.00 if he kept his stock in Company B." In the inaction vignette, they 
read "Mr. Paul owned shares in Company A. During the past year he considered 
switching to stock in Company B—but he decided against it. He now finds that he 
would have been better off by $1,200 if he had switched to Company B." 
 
We added information about the decision-maker to this classic scenario. Participants 
read that the businessman was a person who enjoyed taking risks. They read 
"Mr. Paul loves to take risks. He has been known throughout his life as someone 
who was willing to take a chance. When he was in high school, his friends all 
categorized him as a risk-taker. At this point in Mr. Paul's life, he still likes to take 
chances." 
 
After reading this information, participants proceeded to make consistency ratings 
about how consistent the target's decision was with respect to his preferred 
behavioral orientation: Participants were asked how consistent/inconsistent the 
decision (not switch stocks in the inaction condition or switch stocks in the action 
condition) was with the type of behavior that Mr. Paul typically desired. We 
used an anchored "101" point scale where "0" represented "very inconsistent" and 
"100" represented "very consistent." They also completed a decision-desirability 
measure.^ It is important to note that they were not given information about the 
undesirable consequences of his decision until after they completed these measures. 
Participants were then given information about the outcomes of Mr. Paul's decision. 
 
As in the classic scenario, the level of negative outcomes was the same in both 
conditions. In both action and inaction conditions, he would have been better off 
by $1,200.00 if he made a different decision. Thus the objective quality of the poor 
outcome was identical in both scenarios. Following this information, participants 
were asked how much regret they thought Mr. Paul felt. For this question, we 
used an anchored "101"-point scale where "0" represented "not at all" and "100" 
represented "very much." 
 
Next, participants were given a counterfactual generation task in which they 
were asked to imagine how the outcomes might have been different for Mr. Paul 
"if only . . . " They were given a blank sheet of paper and directed to list as many 
"if only" statements as they could think of, which is a typical counterfactual generation 
task. Finally, participants were given another questionnaire and were asked 
to make another judgment concerning how much regret Mr. Paul felt, using the 
scale described above for the initial regret rating. 
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION: EXPERIMENT 2 
 
Consistency Ratings. Given the characterization of the decision-maker as having 
a risky personality, we expected that participants would think that his decision to 
switch stocks (act) was more consistent than his decision not to switch stocks (inaction). 
This was the case; ratings of consistency were higher in the action condition 
(M = 61.5) than in the inaction condition (M = 32.1), f (1, 59) = 23.7, p < .0001. 
 
Regret Judgments. Participants' judgments of regret were entered into a mixed-factor 
ANOVA including the between-subjects variable of decision type (action, 
inaction) and the within-subjects variable of counterfactual salience (pre- versus 
post-counterfactual generation). This ANOVA revealed a significant main effect 
of decision type (action/inaction), F(l, 58) = 14.81, p < .001, in which decisions to 
not switch stocks (inaction) were rated as more regrettable, M = 77.3, than were 
decisions to switch stocks (action), M - 55.7. This outcome was predicted: given 
that the target—Mr. Paul—was described as being a risk-taker, inactions should 
have been, and were, more inconsistent with his personality orientation and were 
judged as especially regrettable. No other effects reached traditional levels of significance 
in this analysis; all Fs < 1. 
 
Mediation Analyses of Decision-Type (Action, Inaction). We performed a regression 
analysis with action/inaction (dummy-coded) serving as the predictor variable 
and initial, pre-counterfactual, judgments of regret as the dependent variable. This 
analysis revealed that action/inaction was a significant predictor of regret, ß = -.52, 
p < .01, satisfying the first step in Baron & Kenny's (1986) procedure for mediation 
analysis (see David A. Kenny's website for further discussion). Following step 2 
in this procedure, we then tested whether consistency, our potential mediator, was 
related to the outcome variable of regret. This regression demonstrated that consistency 
was significantly related to regret, ß = - .64, p < .01. Following the logic 
of the steps of the analysis, we then performed a regression analysis with action/ 
inaction and consistency serving as predictor variables and judgments of regret as 
the outcome variable. Consistency predicted initial judgments of regret, ß = -.42, p 
< .01, and reduced the effect of decision-type (action/inaction) to a nonsignificant 
level, ß = .05, p < .70. The fact that consistency judgments reduced the action/ 
inaction effect to a nonsignificant level suggests that consistency mediated the in 
fluence that the type of decision had on participants' perceptions of regret. As can 
be inferred from the negative beta value, the relationship between consistency ratings 
and regret was such that regret judgments increased as judged consistency 
decreased, in line with predictions from the consistency fit model. Using the Sobel 
test, we assessed whether the influence of consistency on regret (as a mediator) 
was significantly better than the action/inaction variable alone—this was the case, 
Sobel test statistic = -3.33, p < .001.[3] 
Counterfactuals. A similar analysis as described above was performed with counterfactuals 
as the predictor variable. In this analysis, we found no significant relationship 
between the number of counterfactuals generated and the action/no action 
effect in Step 1 of the Baron and Kenny analysis. This means that the number 
of counterfactuals was not a possible mediator or moderator of the decision-type. 
In this study, counterfactuals did not mediate the influence of decision-type on 
regret. However, we assessed how counterfactuals were related to regret pre- and 
post-counterfactual generation, independent of whether regret was due to an action 
or inaction (i.e., decision-type). In this analysis, action/inaction (dummycoded) 
and number of counterfactuals generated served as predictor variables 
and the difference between participants' pre- and post-counterfactual generation 
regret judgment was the outcome variable. Results revealed that counterfactuals 
significantly predicted the difference between initial (pre-counterfactuals) and 
later (post-counterfactual) judgments, ß = .31, p < .01. As can be inferred from the 
positive beta value, there was a positive relationship between the number of counterfactuals 
generated and increases in participants' judged regret from their pre- to 
their post-counterfactual generation response. 
 
 
EXPERIMENT 3 
 
In Experiment 2, we used a modification of Kahneman's classic stock switching 
paradigm. This is a classic paradigm, and perceptions of others' emotions are important 
in their own right. However, assessing the roles of consistency and counterfactuals 
in a more personally-relevant paradigm is desirable. Therefore, Experiment 
3 was conducted using participants' retrospection of their own real-world 
experiences of regret. In the present experiment, we explored how these retrospections 
were affected by consistency relationships and the salience and number of 
counterfactuals generated. 
 
We asked our participants to recall a situation in which they were in a happy 
and active mood and made a decision to stay home (inaction condition) or to go 
out (action condition) for the evening. This procedure has been used in previous 
research and has been shown to be a valid paradigm that reflects participants' own 
experiences of regret (e.g., Roese et al, 1999). In addition to being realistic, this 
kind of situation represents a circumstance in which we would predict and have 
found an "inaction" effect in regret (Seta et al., 2001). This "inaction" effect is not as 
common and is not the effect predicted from classic norm theory (see also Gilovich 
& Medvec, 1994; Zeleenberg, Dijk, van Bos, Vanden, & Peters, 2002). 
 
According to Kahneman and Miller (1986), inaction is typically the normal state 
of organisms; therefore, actions are usually higher in mutability than are inactions 
and should therefore produce higher levels of regret. However, in keeping with 
the idea that the consistency relationships between decisions and aspects of the 
self are important determinants of regret, inaction can often produce higher levels 
of regret than action. In this experiment, we again set up a situation in which we 
expected inaction decisions to be less consistent than action decisions. Participants 
were asked to think about a time when they felt happy and active, and made a 
decision to either go out for the evening or to stay home. 
 
 
Pre-testing indicated that both of these situations are realistic to students and 
that the vast majority can recall times in which they made these kinds of decisions 
and things did or did not turn out well. In this context, we expected that when our 
student sample looked back on making a decision to go out while in a happy and 
active mood, they would rate this decision to be more consistent than decisions 
to stay in for the evening. Taking action was predicted to be the kind of decision 
that fit with their prevalent mood states and their goal to maintain this mood 
state. Therefore, we predicted that participants would express more regret from 
poor decisions they made to refrain from acting (i.e., not going out) than from acting 
(going out). In contrast to Study 2, which included a within-participants manipulation 
of counterfactual generation. Study 3 employed a between-participants 
manipulation of this variable, asking half of our participants to generate counterfactuals 
before indicating regret and asking half to generate counterfactuals after 
indicating their regret. 
 
 
METHOD: EXPERIMENT 3 
 
Participants and Design 
Participants were 241 undergraduates, 100 males and 141 females, who were enrolled 
in introductory psychology courses at a small private university (Wake Forest 
University). Students volunteered as an option for completing research class 
requirements. A 2 x 2 between subjects design was used to assess the effects of 
decision-type (action/inaction) and counterfactual salience (regret ratings taken 
either before or after counterfactual generation). The primary measured variables 
were decision consistency, regret levels, and the number of counterfactuals generated. 
 
Procedure 
Participants completed the experiment in small groups and were assigned randomly 
to conditions. Materials were presented in written form so that all experimental 
conditions could be (and were) presented in every session. Participants 
were asked to write down six statements that described themselves when they 
felt happy and active. Following this procedure, participants were asked to think 
back to a situation in which they were at home and contemplated going out for 
the evening. We directed them to think back to a time in which they were feeling 
active and happy and decided to either go out (action condition) or to stay home 
(inaction condition) but had learned that they would have had a better time if they 
had made the opposite decision. 
 
Procedures then diverged; half the participants were asked to generate counterfactuals 
(counterfactual salience condition) and half made regret responses 
without generating counterfactuals (counterfactual not salient condition). Regret 
ratings were made on the same type of scale as described in Experiment 2 and the 
counterfactual instructions were identical to those used in this previous experiment. 
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION: EXPERIMENT 3 
 
A 2 X 2 between-subjects ANOVA was conducted in which participants' regret 
response was the dependent variable. The design included the between-subjects 
variables of counterfactual salience and of decision-type: to act (go out) or not to 
act. As predicted, the ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of decision-type 
on regret, F(l, 236) = 19.22, p < .01, in which participants in the inaction condition 
expressed more regret about their decision (M = 60.3) than did those in the action 
condition (M = 47.6). In addition, a significant main effect of counterfactual 
salience was obtained, f (1, 236) = 4.34, p < .05; participants reported feeling more 
regret after generating counterfactuals (counterfactuals salient) (M = 57.0) than 
when they did not generate counterfactuals before making their judgments (M = 
50.9). This result indicates that making counterfactuals salient by explicitly asking 
participants to list alternatives augments their feelings of regret. The interaction 
between counterfactual salience and decision-type did not approach significance, 
F < 1 (see Table 1 for the cell means). 
 
Mediation Analyses 
We performed a series of regression analyses to assess the role of consistency and 
counterfactuals in mediating action/inaction regret. The first regression revealed 
that decision-type (dummy- coded in terms of the action/ inaction condition) was 
a significant predictor of regret, ß = .271, p < .001, fulfilling step one of Baron and 
Kermy's (1986) mediation analysis procedure. Following step two, we then assessed 
whether consistency, the hypothesized mediator, was significantly related 
to the decision-type regret effect which was the case, ß - -.691, p < .001. Finally, we 
assessed whether the decision-type effect was reduced to a nonsignificant level 
when consistency scores were entered in to the regression equation, following Baron 
and Kenny's filial procedural steps. The outcome of this analysis revealed that 
the action/inaction effect (decision-type) was reduced to a nonsignificant level, ß 
= .013, p < .874, while consistency ratings remained significant, ß = -.373, p < .001. 
Using the Sobel test, we found that the addition of consistency as a mediator was 
significantly better than the manipulated variable of act/no act alone, Sobel statistic 
= 2.47, p < .02, Thus, these analyses suggest that the consistency of the decision 
mediated the effect of decision-type(action/inaction)on regret.[4] 
 
We performed a similar set of regression analyses assessing the role that counterfactuals 
played in predicting regret-levels. Because only half of our sample generated 
counterfactuals prior to making regret judgments, we included only these 
participants in these regressions, n = 115. For this sample, decision-type (dummycoded 
in terms of the act/ inaction condition) did influence regret, ß = .239, p =.01; 
therefore, there was a significant effect to explore, fulfilling step one of Baron and 
Kermy's (1986) procedure. 
 
Decision-type was significantly related to the number of counterfactuals generated, 
ß = -.220, p <. 05, establishing counterfactuals as a potential mediator of this 
effect. We then tested whether counterfactuals mediated the effects of the decision-type 
effect on levels of regret by performing a simultaneous regression analysis 
including decision type (dummy coded) and the number of counterfactuals generated 
as predictor variables with regret levels as the dependent variable. In this 
regression, the decision-type variable remained a significant predictor of regret, ß 
= ..289, p < .01, suggesting that counterfactuals did not mediate the effect of decision- 
type on regret levels. Importantly, however, counterfactuals did not drop-out 
as a significant predictor in this equation; the number of counterfactuals generated 
remained a significant predictor of overall levels of regret, ß = .126, p < .05. So, 
even though the number of counterfactuals did not mediate the effect of decision-type 
(action/inaction) per se, counterfactuals were associated with and predicted 
regret levels. The positive beta value indicates that regret levels increased as the 
number of counterfactuals generated increased. This finding adds further support 
for the idea that the production of counterfactuals can function as an affective cue 
influencing feelings of regret. 
 
 
STUDY 4 
 
From the consistency-fit perspective, regret follows from the relationship between 
salient characteristics or states of an individual and the nature of the decision the 
individual makes. The same decisions can be consistent for some persons and not 
others. The aim of Study 4 was to assess the role of the consistency between personalities 
and types of decisions in producing feelings of regret. Specifically, we 
investigated the relationship between the personality dimension of extraversion/ 
introversion and the types of decisions that would produce regret. 
 
 
 
 
 
Perhaps the most widely-used measure of individual differences in personality 
is the Big Five personality inventory (Goldberg, 1992). The "Big Five" is a five-factor 
model of the structure of personality that was developed via factor analysis 
of 1600 trait-descriptive adjectives (see Wiggins & Trapnell, 1997) and includes the 
dimensions of agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, openness to experience, 
and sociability (extroversion/introversion). Researchers have demonstrated 
these five traits to be relatively stable across situations (e.g., Mischel & Shoda, 
1995), across cultures (e.g., Costa, Terracciano, & McOae, 2001) and over time 
(e.g., Caspi et al., 2003; McCrae et al, 2000). 
 
One trait that may be especially relevant to experiences of regret in the context 
of decisions to act or not to act is the personality domain of extroversion/ 
introversion. Extroversion/introversion is the social domain of personality and 
is characterized by sociability and assertiveness (Costil & McCrae, 1980). Extroverts 
are more active than introverts across different contexts. In an investigation 
of approach/avoidance tendencies in conjunction with the Big Five traits. Carver, 
Sutton, and Scheier (2000) found extroversion to be positively correlated with "approach" 
behaviors, which indicates an orientation towards action. This research 
suggests that extroverts may find poor decisions related to inaction (e.g., staying 
home) more inconsistent and regrettable than decisions related to action (e.g., going 
out). Similarly, introverts may find poor decisions related to going out (action) 
more inconsistent and regrettable than those related to staying home (inaction). 
In the following study, we asked participants to retrospect on their past decisions 
to go out or to stay home similar to the procedures of Experiment 3. Additionally, 
participants were classified as introverts or extroverts based on their responses 
to a Big Five trait measure. We expected this personality variable to interact with 
the decision-type variable. In addition, we included a within-subjects factor of the 
salience of counterfactuals (pre- and post-counterfactual generation). Our expectation 
was that the generation of counterfactuals would magnify regret for both 
introverts and extroverts in the context of both decisions to act or not act. 
 
 
METHOD: STUDY 4 
 
Participants and Design 
Participants were 149 undergraduates enrolled in introductory psychology at 
Wake Forest University. Students earned partial course credit toward the research 
option in introductory psychology in exchange for their ¡participation in the study. 
Prior to their participation in the study, the students took part in a large mass 
testing sessions in which the "Big Five" inventory was administered. Participants 
were not selected for the study on the basis of their scores on this inventory, but 
only students who had been in mass-testing were eligible to enroll in this study. 
A quasi-experimental 2 x 2 x 2 design was employed including the between-subjects 
factors of decision-type (action/inaction) and introversion/extroversion. 
Counterfactual salience (generation pre- or post-regret measurement) was manipulated 
within-subjects as was the case in Experiment 2. Measured variables were 
decision consistency, regret levels, and the numbers of counterfactuals generated. 
 
Materials and Procedure 
Following informed consent, participants completed a modified version of Goldberg's 
(1992) Big Five personality inventory identical to that used in mass testing. 
This inventory consists of 60 words, 12 words pertaining to each of the Big Five 
personality traits (extroversion, neuroticism, conscientiousness, openness, and 
agreeableness). Participants read instructions telling them to rate how accurately 
each word describes them, with 1 being "extremely inaccurate" and 9 being "extremely 
accurate." The full version of this inventory has been demonstrated to be 
reliable on all five measures, with a test-retest reliability of .90-.92 for extraversion 
(Goldberg, 1992). 
 
Participants were given written packets containing instructions so that all manipulated 
variables could be represented within each session. Each question/instruction 
was located on a separate page of the packet. First, participants were 
asked to think about a situation in which they were at home and contemplated 
going out for the evening. The decision-type manipulation was realized by directing 
participants to recall making the choice to either go out (action) or to stay home 
(inaction). In both cases, they would have had a better time if they had made the 
opposite decision. These instructions were similar to those used in Experiment 3 
with the exception that there was no manipulation of mood and no mention of 
mood maintenance as a goal in the setting. In addition, this study used a within-subjects 
manipulation of counterfactual generation, similar to that used in Experiment 
2. 
 
Following retrospections, all participants were asked to rate their decision's 
consistency with respect to their general personality characteristics. This rating 
was made on an anchored "0—very inconsistent" to "100—very consistent" scale. 
Next, all participants were asked to give a regret rating concerning how much regret 
they felt about their decision. This rating was made on an anchored "0—none 
at all" to "100—very much" scale. Following these responses, participants turned 
the page, and were asked to generate counterfactuals by completing as many "if 
only" statements as they found possible. Following this task, another regret rating 
was obtained (on a different page) using the scale described above. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Analyses 
We assessed the test/retest reliability of the extraversion dimension of Goldberg's 
(1992) Big Five inventory by obtaining two scores from each participant: One was 
acquired during mass testing sessions at the beginning of the semester and the 
other was acquired during the experiment that took place several weeks later. The 
correlation between participants' extraversion scores obtained at each of these 
times was significant, r - .87, p < .001, showing good test-retest reliability for this 
scale. 
 
Primary Analyses 
One participant was excluded from this analysis because of missing data and two 
other participants were excluded because their regret scores were 2 SDs from the 
mean; they reported zero levels of regret A regression analysis was performed to 
assess the relationships between extraversion levels, decision-type (dummy-coded) 
and pre-post counterfactual generation scores (outcome variables) This analysis 
revealed a significant effect of decision-type on regret levels F = 3.88, p = .05 , 
a significant effect of extraversion level on regret, F - 7.35, but more importantly 
indicated an interaction between these predictor variables, F = 4.29, p < .04. (When 
the two participants whose regret levels were reported as zero were included in 
the analysis, the interaction effect was p < .08.) As can be seen in Table 2, introverts 
regretted poor decisions to go out more than decisions to stay home whereas extraverts 
regretted poor decisions to stay home more than to go out. This finding 
supports the view that the consistency of a decision in relation to personality orientations 
determines what kinds of poor decisions produce more or less regret.[5] 
 
We also analyzed pre- and post-counterfactual generation regret scores as a repeated 
measure (ANOVA) and found a significant main effect of counterfactual 
salience, F(l, 144) - 6.10, p = .015: regret ratings given after counterfactual generation 
(M = 57.2) were higher than those given before counterfactual generation (M 
= 54.0). This finding conceptually replicates the results of the prior two studies and 
suggests that generating counterfactuals can augment regret levels. 
 
Subsidiary Analyses 
Our hypothesis suggests that regret following a negative outcome occurs as the result 
of personality-behavior inconsistency. Thus, we conducted a Pearson correlation 
analysis on participants' self-rated consistency and initial regret level. As predicted, 
this analysis revealed a significant negative correlation, r = -.268, p < .001, 
indicating that, as predicted, regret increased as consistency ratings decreased. 
We also performed an analysis of the number of participants who scored at or 
above the median or below the median number of counterfactuals that were generated 
(Median = 5) and whether these participants increased or decreased their 
regret ratings following generating these counterfactuals. As would be expected if 
the number of counterfactuals generated served as an affective cue for regret, there 
tended to be more participants who decreased versus increased their regret ratings 
after generating below median numbers of counterfactuals than was the case for 
participants who generated above or median value counterfactual numbers, Chi-square 
= 3.51 (1), p = .061. Although not significant, participants who generated 
more counterfactuals tended to increase their regret ratings. This pattern dupli- 
cates that seen in Experiment 2 and suggests that the number of counterfactuals 
generated can serve as affective cues that influence feelings of regret. 
 
 
 
 
 
We also analyzed regret levels in the identical design as described, with the 
exception that we substituted participants' level of "agreeableness" for the dimension 
of "sociability." There were no effects of this personality factor. Thus, the consistency 
relationship operative in this study was indeed due to the relationship between 
participants' level of sociability and their decisions to go out or stay home. 
 
 
DISCUSSION: STUDY 4 
 
Study 4 examined the consistency-fit model of regret in conjunction with the Big 
Five personality traits of extraversion/introversion and in the context of a decision 
related to sociability. We found that the consistency of the decision (to stay home 
or to go out) with respect to participants' sociability orientation affected regret 
levels in a manner expected from the view that consistency-fit is an important determinant 
of feelings of regret. Higher levels of regret were associated with lower 
ratings of consistency. Regret levels following both decisions to act (go out) or to 
refrain from acting (stay home) differed depending upon whether that decision 
was consistent or inconsistent with the participants' sociability orientation. Thus, 
an important determinant of regret following a negative outcome is not simply 
whether or not an action occurred, but whether or not individuals' decisions are 
consistent with their personality orientation—in this case, sociability orientations. 
In addition, the finding that regret levels given after counterfactual generation 
were higher than those given before counterfactual generation provides evidence 
that the salience of counterfactuals influenced regret. In doing so, these results 
provide further evidence for the idea that counterfactuals can serve as affective 
cues affecting regret levels. 
It also is important to note that the domain of the decision explored in this study 
was related directly to the individual differences measured. So, for example, we 
would not necessarily expect decisions to act or not act that are unrelated to sociability 
to be affected by the personality dimension measured in this study. The 
domains of action that are differentially regrettable for extraverts versus introverts 
are an interesting research topic but are beyond the scope of the present paper. 
 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
The present research supported the idea that consistency-driven processes and 
counterfactual generation are both important for understanding the level of regret 
experienced following poor choices and extends previous work in several ways. 
Prior studies testing the idea that consistency-fit influences levels of regret (e.g.. 
Seta et al., 2001) did not implicate motives to change from a person's normal state. 
Experiment 1 extended the consistency-fit analysis into the domain of goal-related 
motives to change normative behaviors. In this study, decision makers had a goal 
to change their eating habits and then made a decision to order a meal that either 
was consistent or inconsistent with their goal. In all cases, the meal turned out 
to be undesirable and thus the decision was a poor one. As predicted, the target 
person whose decision was typical but inconsistent with her goal was judged to 
have an especially high level of regret. Thus, this finding provided support for the 
idea that feelings of regret derive from the consistency of decisions in relation to 
decision-makers' goals. 
 
As discussed in the Introduction section and seen in Experiment 1, the role of 
consistency in determining regret may be functional in a self-regulation system, 
providing information about whether one's decisions are in line with desired 
goals or standards. The consistency-fit of a decision and resulting levels of regret 
may serve as cues operating within the monitoring or "test" phase of regulatory 
feedback loops (e.g., Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996; Carver & Scheier, 1981). Test 
phases necessarily involve comparisons of the actual st.ite of the self to standards; 
therefore, comparisons indicating that poor decisions were at least of a type that 
were commensurate with these standards (i.e., were consistent) should be less regrettable 
than those that were incongruent with these goal states. If regret operates 
within a self-regulation system, feelings of regret may provide direction for our 
behaviors by moving us away from choices that do not fit our goals and towards 
those that do, regardless of whether the decision is to change or to maintain current 
or typical state of being. 
 
In addition to providing evidence for the consistency fit perspective, the results 
of Experiments 2-4 provided evidence that the production of counterfactuals influenced 
regret levels. One way to understand this influence of counterfactuals is 
to conceptualize them as affective cues intensifying (or minimizing) feelings of 
regret. Assuming that counterfactuals can be affective cues places them under the 
umbrella of Sanna and Schwarz's (2004) theoretical analysis of several judgment 
biases (Sanna, Schwarz, & Small, 2002; Sarma, Schwarz, & Stocker, 2002), in which 
they highlight the common mechanisms underlying confidence changes, planning 
fallacies, impact bias, and hindsight biases. They suggest that the interaction between 
thoughts about focal events and alternative events, as well as the ease or difficulty 
 
with which such thoughts come to mind, are responsible for the emergence 
of these biases. 
 
It may be the case that consistency-driven processes are especially influential 
in determining the kinds of decisions that are regretted (e.g., actions vs. inactions) 
whereas, when they are salient, counterfactuals may increase the overall level of 
regret. We did not find evidence in these studies that consistency influenced the 
number of counterfactuals that were generated. That is, people did not generate 
more counterfactuals when decisions were inconsistent versus consistent. And 
regression analyses revealed that consistency and the number of counterfactuals 
generated were independent predictors of regret—consistency manipulations mediated 
the kinds of decisions that were most regrettable whereas the number of 
counterfactuals generated influenced the overall levels of regret. Further research 
can be directed toward further exploration of these roles. For example, focal atten- 
tion to the decision-making process may increase the weighing of consistency factors 
in determining regret whereas focal attention directed at the outcomes of the 
decision per se may increase the weighing of counterfactuals in determining the 
intensity of regret. Furthermore, other dimensions of counterfactual generation, 
(e.g., the ease with which they come to mind) may also play a role in regret. 
 
Comparisons to Alternative Approaches. This consistency-fit analysis of regret differs 
from previous conceptualizations in several important ways. In contrast to 
economic or rationale perspectives, the amount of negative affect experienced 
from poor decisions is not determined solely by the loss (e.g.. Bell, 1982). Rather, 
the relationship between the nature of the decision and the nature of the decision-maker 
also must be taken into consideration (e.g., a conservative investor should 
feel more regret than a risk-taker when his investments in volatile stocks plunge). 
Our analysis follows in the tradition of classic consistency models (e.g., Festinger, 
1957) that highlight the important role those relationships between characteristics 
of a person (e.g., her attitudes, etc.) and behavior (e.g., decisions) play in determining 
affective reactions. 
 
According to a consistency-fit perspective, the relationship between the decision 
and a standard—decision-makers' goals, moods, or personality characteristics— 
can determine the normativeness of a decision. Thus, when it is important for individuals 
to change their normal way of being, the consistency of a decision would 
be determined in relation to goals to change, rather than what is normal or typical 
for that person. The goal of changing would be the accessible and important dimension 
of comparison, as was seen in Experiment 1. In this case, what is "normal" 
is not what is "typical" but what should follow from decision-makers' goals. 
In providing insight into what is normal, the consistency-fit perspective helps to 
refine our understanding of normality, which is of course a key concept within 
norm theory (e.g., Kahneman & Miller, 1986). Normality can be seen as a contextually 
determined dimension affecting judgments and emotions, such as regret. 
 
 
 
NOTES 
1. We intended to include a measure of participants' perceptions of how consistent the target's 
decision was with her goal of changing her eating habits as a manipulation check. However, 
there were errors in the wording of this question that prevented a meaningful interpretation of 
this measure. We presented a separate group of 36 participants with similar scenarios as used in 
Experiment 1, manipulating whether the target's meal choice was consistent or inconsistent with her 
goal of losing weight. Measures of the consistency of her decision with respect to her goal were taken 
and revealed a significant correlation with the goal consistency manipulation, r = .82, p < .01, such 
that participants thought that the choice to order a high caloric meal was more inconsistent with the 
target's goal to lose weight than the choice to order a low caloric meal. 
2. Participants were given a measure of decision desirability after their consistency ratings. They 
were asked how sad or happy they believed Mr. Paul felt after his decision, using a 101 point scale 
anchored with "0" "very sad" to "100" "very happy." 
3. A conceptually identical mediation analysis with action/inaction and desirability serving as 
predictor variables and judgments of regret as the dependent variable was conducted to determine 
whether desirability ratings were also a significant mediator of action/inaction effects. Desirability 
was expected to mediate this relationship because affective quality should be related to the 
consistency of the decision (see Seta et al., 2001). As expected, desirability predicted regret judgments, 
ß = -.33, p < .01, and reduced the action/inaction predictor variable to a nonsignificant level, ß = 
.22, p < .10. As desirability increased, judgments of regret decreased. Thus, both consistency and 
desirability mediated judgments of regret. 
4. Participants also were asked to rate how desirable their decision was in terms of their goal to 
have a good time on that occasion. Similar procedures were applied to assess whether desirability 
ratings also mediated decision-type effects. Desirability was a significant predictor of regret levels 
in decisions to act or not act, ß = -.514, p < .001, and, as revealed in the first analysis, decision-type 
significantly predicted regret, ß = .271, p < .001. When desirability was entered into a regression 
analysis with decision-type, action/no action dropped out as a significant predictor, ß = .048, p = 
.476, while desirability remained significant, ß = -.434, p < .001. This suggests that desirability of the 
decision also mediates the effects of decision-type. 
5. To be certain that these results were not an artifact, and that the personality dimension of 
extraversion/introversion was the critical dimension defining the behavioral consistency, we 
performed the analysis described above using the dimension of "agreeableness" on the Big Five 
inventory. No significant main effects or interactions involving this variable were found, F < 1, 
supporting the conclusion that consistency in relation to participants' degree of sociability was the 
critical factor in this study. 
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